In the recent banking literature, the relationships between credit risk and the business cycle have been analyzed for both (macro) financial stability and (micro) risk management purposes. The vast majority of these studies generally neglect the presence of asymmetric effects, i.e., the possibility that the impact is dissimilar over different phases of the business cycle. In this paper, we try to make a step forward and shed some light on these open issues. For our analysis, we employ Threshold Regression models with two or more regimes both at the aggregate and at the individual level, exploiting a unique dataset on Italian bank borrowers' default rates. In particular, we analyze whether the relationship between business cycle and credit risk is subject to regime switches, determining endogenously the thresholds. Furthermore, we test whether the impact of the business cycle is more pronounced when credit risk starts at higher levels, endogenously identifying the risk threshold over/below which such impact is different. Our results suggest that the impact of the business cycle is more pronounced when starting credit risk levels are higher and during downturns. JEL Classification: C22, C23, G21, G28
Introduction
In the recent banking literature, the relationship between credit risk and the business cycle has been analyzed for both (macro) financial stability and (micro) risk management purposes. Indeed, the potential impact of the economic developments on banks' portfolios is relevant for both policy makers, interested in forecasting and preventing banks' instability due to unfavorable economic conditions, and risk managers, who pay attention on the robustness of their capital allocation plans under different scenarios. These different perspectives are not mutually exclusive; the reform of the Basel Accord on banks' capital requirements made it clear the need to match the micro and macro dimensions.
From a macro prudential point of view, many analyses have quantified the effects of macroeconomic conditions on asset quality (for a survey, see Quagliariello, in press) . As an example, Pesola (2001) shows that shortfalls of GDP growth below forecast contributed to the banking crises in the Nordic countries, while Salas and Saurina (2002) document that macroeconomic shocks are quickly transmitted to Spanish banks' portfolio riskiness. Similarly, using Italian data, Marcucci and Quagliariello (in press) find that bank borrowers' default rates increase in bad macroeconomic times. Meyer and Yeager (2001) and Gambera (2000) document that a small number of macroeconomic variables are good predictors for the non-performing loan ratio in the US. Similarly, Hoggarth et al. (2005) provide evidence of a link between the state of the UK business cycle and banks' write-offs. Analogous evidence is provided in crosscountry comparisons by Bikker and Hu (2002) , Laeven and Majoni (2003) and Valckx (2003) .
However, the vast majority of these studies generally neglect asymmetric effects, i.e., the possibility that the impact on banks' portfolios is different in different phases of the business cycle. An exception is the paper by Gasha and Morales (2004) who apply a SETAR model to country-level data and show that GDP growth affects non-performing loans only below a certain threshold.
By contrast, these asymmetries are somewhat taken into account in a number of studies on credit risk management. In particular, some analyses on the properties of credit rating transition matrices over the cycle have analyzed whether transition probabilities are affected to a larger (smaller) extent by recessionary (expansionary) conditions. Regime switching models are the tool commonly used for this kind of investigations. On the basis of GDP growth, Nickell et al. (2000) divide the business cycle into three categories (peaks, normal times and troughs) and find that, in peaks, low-rated bonds are less prone to downgrades. Default probabilities are particularly sensitive to the business cycle. They also note that the effect of the cycle on investmentgrade obligors is more to raise volatility than to shift ratings systematically down. The impact of macroeconomic conditions appears therefore to be asymmetric and dependent on the starting creditworthiness of each borrower. Bangia et al. (2002) in their analysis of the linkage between macroeconomic conditions and migration matrices distinguish two states of the economy, expansion and recession, and condition the migration matrix to these states. Their findings suggest that the downgrading probabilities, particularly in the extreme classes, increase significantly in recessions. Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005) adopt a similar framework in order to assess the impact of the business cycle on capital requirements under Basel II. This approach requires the identification of expansions/recessions based on some external sources. Moreover, discrete regime switching models may reveal unsatisfactory for dynamic credit risk management. For example, Lucas and Klaassen (2005) point out that the combination of an insufficient distinction between multiple economic regimes as well as a lacking identification of these regimes may weaken on the ability of these tools to discriminate between default regimes 1 . In particular, they show that implied asset correlations and default rate volatilities are biased towards zero and implausibly low. A further shortcoming of this literature is that the hypothesis that asymmetries depend on the severity of the recession rather than on the dichotomy expansion/recession is completely neglected.
Overall, the existing literature provides an incomplete picture of the evolution of credit quality over the business cycle. In this paper, we try to make a relevant step forward and shed some light on these open issues. For our analysis, we employ Threshold Regression approach and exploit a unique dataset on Italian bank borrowers' default rates. In particular, we analyze whether the relationship between business cycle and credit risk is subject to regime switches and endogenously determine the thresholds at which the system switches from one regime to the other. Furthermore, we test whether the impact of the business cycle is more pronounced when starting credit risk levels are higher identifying endogenously the risk threshold over/below which such impact is different. We also suggest a 4-regime approach which allows us to provide a very comprehensive discussion on the behavior of default rates over changing economic conditions.
1 Most of the work in this field employs the NBER business cycle classifications. Lucas and Klaassen (2005) "cast serious doubts" on their use.
We find that the impact of the business cycle is more pronounced when credit risk levels are high and in unfavorable economic conditions. Under risk sensitive capital requirements, this evidence may provide some guidance to banks and supervisors in the choice of adequate capital buffers over different phases of the business cycle. Furthermore, the methodology we propose may be easily adapted for stress testing banks' portfolios.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the threshold regression models adopted both for the aggregate data and for the panel data with 2 or more regimes. Section 3 describes the data on Italian banks' portfolios while in section 4 we comment on the empirical results. Finally, section 5 draws some concluding remarks and directions for further research.
Threshold regression models
Threshold regression models are quite popular in the non-linear time-series literature because they are relatively simple to estimate and interpret. The idea of approximating a general non-linear structure by a threshold regression model with a small number of regimes is due to Tong (see Tong, 1983 for an early review and Tong, 1990 for a deeper review). When the discontinuity in the threshold is replaced by a smooth transition function, the model can be generalized into a smooth transition model (see Chan and Tong, 1986 , Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993 , and Teräsvirta et al., 1994 .
In this section we briefly introduce the threshold regression model for the aggregate time series of default rate, the threshold model for panel data with 2 or more regimes defined over the same threshold variable and the threshold model for panel data with 4 regimes identified through two different threshold variables.
Our starting hypothesis is that the default rate is affected by the business cycle and that such an impact is subject to one or more regime-switch. (6) we can run OLS regression of (4) for γ ∈ Γ , where the elements of Γ are slightly less than T because we have to take a certain percentage ( ) % η of observations out to ensure that each regime has a minimum number of observations.
Aggregate model with two regimes
Then the value of γ that minimizes the residual variance is the LS estimate of the threshold parameter. The LS estimates of the coefficients θ are then found as
Similarly, the LS residuals are
An important question is whether the model in (2) is statistically significant relative to the linear specification in (1). The relevant null hypothesis is 0
As it is well known, this testing problem is non standard because there are some parameters that are not identified under the null (the so-called 'Davies' (1977 'Davies' ( , 1987 problem'). Based on the theories of Davies (1977 Davies ( , 1987 and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) , Hansen (1996) shows that if the errors are iid, a test with near-optimal power against alternatives distant from the null hypothesis is the standard F-statistic
where ( )
is the residual variance under the null hypothesis and θ is the OLS estimate under the null of no threshold, i.e. 
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state variable which is usually modeled as a first-order Markov chain. For details see Hamilton (1994) or Franses and Van Dijk (2000) . 
and the appropriate test for the null is ( )
To obtain the bootstrap pvalue, it is sufficient to repeat the bootstrap procedure as before setting
Panel data model with a single threshold variable and two or more regimes
As in Hansen (1999) TA and lgr it are the log of total assets and the loan growth rate of bank i at time t, respectively, while ( ) I ⋅ is the indicator function. The logarithm of total assets is included to control for size, while loan growth rate controls for loan dynamics. The non-linear terms are included to reduce the possibility of spurious correlations due to omitted variable bias. Lack of data does not permit the estimation of models with a richer set of bank-specific variables.
In model (11) 
In this way, the first regime is characterized by recessionary conditions, while in the second one we have booming conditions (the output gap is greater than a certain threshold, 1 γ ). Secondly, we can generalize model (11) by considering the possibility of more than 2 regimes over the same threshold variables. For example we can consider 3 regimes over the banking variable (that is good, medium and bad bank) with the following model We can further generalize the model by including a third threshold, so that we can characterize 4 banking regimes. The same strategy can be adopted for model (12) with different business cycle regimes.
A more compact way to represent models (11), (12) and their generalizations is ( )
where ( ) 
in case of model (11). To estimate this class of models we can employ a fixed effects transformation by removing the individual specific effects. We can take the averages over time of (14) getting
where
. Taking the differences between (14) and (16) 
and for any given value of the threshold γ this model can be estimated by OLS, i.e.
with regression residuals ( ) ( ) ( )
Chan (1993) and Hansen (1999) 
Since the SSE ( ) S γ depends on the threshold only through the indicator functions, the SSE is a step function with at most NT steps. The minimization in (21) can thus be reduced to a search over at most NT different values of the threshold variable. This is achieved by sorting the threshold eliminating the smallest and the largest δ % to ensure a minimum number of observations in each regime. However, since this procedure might be numerically intensive with long time spans and large panels, Hansen (1999) suggests using 393 quantiles, reducing the grid search over { } 1.00%,1.25%,1.50%,...,98.75%,99.00% . For other details on the estimation of these models, see Hansen (1999) and Marcucci and Lotti (2006) .
As in the aggregate case, it is important to test whether the models in (11) Again, under the null the thresholds γ are not identified leading to the 'Davies' problem'. This implies that classical tests have non-standard distributions. We can again adopt the bootstrap procedure suggested by Hansen (1996) to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the test under the null hypothesis of no thresholds. Under the null, the model can be compactly represented as
or as in (17) 
where 
Panel data model with two threshold variables and four regimes
As an extension of Hansen's (1999) model, we can use a 4-regime panel data model where the regimes are determined by two different threshold variables, as suggested by Marcucci and Lotti (2006) . The simplest version of the model takes the form In model (24) the observations are divided into 4 regimes depending on both the default rate of each bank and the output gap. With this model we can discriminate good and bad banks in both booming and recessionary conditions. In this way we can look at their different behavior over different phases of the business cycle. As before, each regime is characterized by a different slope ( 1 , 1,..., 4 j j β = ) and to identify them it is required that both the regressors and the threshold variables are not time invariant. The errors are assumed to be iid with zero mean and finite variance while the asymptotic analysis is again performed with fixed T and N → ∞ .
To estimate this model we can employ the fixed effects transformation as with the 2-regime panel data model discussed before. We can then apply conditional LS minimizing the concentrated SSE as in (21). As before, it is fundamental to test whether the model (24) is statistically significant relative to the simplest models with only one threshold. The null hypothesis in this case is that of one threshold. Thus, we again have the problem of some parameters not identified under the null, implying a non-standard testing problem. We can therefore adopt the bootstrap procedure suggested by Marcucci and Lotti (2006) which is similar to that one discussed before in the case of only one threshold. An approximate likelihood ratio test of one threshold against two thresholds can be based on the statistic ( ) ( )
The null hypothesis of one threshold is rejected for large values of 21 F . We can use a similar bootstrap procedure as in the 2-regime panel model to obtain the approximate asymptotic distribution of the test. To generate the bootstrap samples we hold both the regressors and thresholds fixed in repeated bootstrap samples. Then we follow the same steps discussed before to obtain the bootstrap p-value of the test.
Data on the Italian banks' portfolios
In this section, we apply the methodology described above to a large panel of Italian intermediaries. The starting point for our analysis is the choice of an adequate measure of the default rate. In Italy, banks must value loans in their portfolios at their estimated realizable value. In particular, the exposures to insolvent borrowers, regardless of any collateral received, are classified as bad loans. Since Italian banks tend to classify their exposures correctly and with appropriate timing (Moody's, 2003) , bad loans are a good indicator of the riskiness of banks' debtors. Therefore, we compute our riskiness indicator as the ratio of the flow of loans classified as bad debts in the reference period to the performing loans outstanding at the end of the previous period. The ratio can be interpreted as the default rate of banks' borrowers. With respect to other riskiness indicators, which are based on stock measures, such as the nonperforming loan ratio, the default rate is a more precise and timely proxy for banks' portfolio riskiness. Furthermore, in order to improve the reliability and timeliness of the indicator, we use the "adjusted" bad debts as signaled by the Italian Central Credit Register.
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Since default rates from the Central Credit Register are available at bank level, we can exploit the cross-sectional dimension and work at different levels of aggregation -from the banking system to each single bank's portfolio -in order to check for the robustness of our results. Regarding the proxy for economic conditions, we focus on output gap, which is the difference between the actual and the potential domestic product. We compute the output gap from the Hodrick-Prescott filtered series. For robustness, as alternative proxies, we employ the deviations of GDP series from its trend and the GDP growth rate.
Accounting ratios for the individual institutions are built up using the statistics that intermediaries are required to report to the Bank of Italy; the macroeconomic variables are drawn from the OECD statistics. The resulting dataset includes 220 banks and span from 1990Q1 to 2005Q2. All data are quarterly. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the data. We report both the micro bank data and the macro data on different measures of output gap.
[ Table 1 about here] Table 2 reports the results for the 2-regime threshold model estimated using aggregate data. Given the scarcity of data, in our preferred parsimonious model, the default rate dr depends on 1-quarter lag of GAP. The results for model 1 confirm the 3 Adjusted bad loans are those outstanding when a borrower is reported to the Central Credit Register: a) as a bad debt by the only bank that disbursed credit; b) as a bad debt by one bank and as having an overshoot by the only other bank exposed; c) as a bad debt by one bank and the amount of the bad debt is at least 70% of its exposure towards the banking system or as having overshoots equal to or more than 10% of its total loans outstanding; d) as a bad debt by at least two banks for amounts equal to or more than 10% of its total loans outstanding.
Empirical results

Model with a single threshold variable and two regimes: aggregate data
The default rate as the threshold variable
well-known negative relationship between default rates and business cycle, with no regime changes.
Our second set of results shows the impact of the business cycle depending on the starting level of banks' riskiness, proxied by either contemporaneous (model 2) or lagged dr (model 3). We note that there is a switch of regime when bank borrowers' default rates are above an endogenous threshold. In particular, the statistical significance and magnitude of 12 β suggest that for banks with lower asset quality, economic conditions have a statistically significant impact on their loan portfolios. By contrast, for good banks (i.e., when dr is below the threshold) the impact of the business cycle on default rates is almost nil and not significant. The LR test for the null of no regime switch is significant at any conventional level, suggesting that our approach is appropriate.
To check the robustness of our results we estimated the same models with different proxies of the business cycle and greater lags for the threshold variable. Our results are not affected by the choice of a greater lag for the threshold variable and are robust to the use of different proxies for the phase of the business cycle (deviation with respect to a linear trend, GDP growth).
As we mentioned above, an advantage of our methodology is that it allows us to obtain an endogenous estimate of the threshold. Looking at Table 2 , we observe that the value of the threshold is very similar across models and specifications, ranging between .54 and .58%. Taken at its face value, this means that, when the aggregate default rate is above these figures, the banking system tends to be more prone to macroeconomic turbulences. In a macroprudential perspective, this advises to reinforce monitoring activities in these periods.
[ Table 2 about here]
The output gap as the threshold variable
With model 4, we try to assess whether the impact of the business cycle on banks is also subject to a second kind of regime switch, which depends on the phase of the business cycle itself. Our results suggest that in recessions the impact of the business cycle on credit risk is statistically significant and more pronounced than in expansionary phases when the impact is less intense and not significant. Again, these results are generally robust to the use of different business cycle indicators.
Model with a single threshold variable and two regimes: institutional breakdowns
In order to check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the models at different levels of aggregation. In particular, we classify banks into 3 different institutional categories: limited companies, cooperative banks and mutual banks. Table  3 shows that the econometric results are substantially unchanged with respect to those presented above for the aggregate case.
[ Table 3 about here]
The impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk is negative and statistically significant when the quality of banks' portfolios is lower (i.e. for bad banks), while it is not for banks with better portfolios -models 2, 6, 7, 10, and 11. β 11 is significant at the 10 per cent level for limited banks; however, its magnitude is considerably lower than that of 12 β . The LR tests reject the null of no regime switch at any conventional level. The estimated thresholds are very close across the 3 categories and similar to those obtained with the aggregate models. When GAP is the threshold variable, the results for models 4, 8 and 12 confirm that the relationship between business cycle and credit risk is significantly negative only during recessions.
Panel data model with a single threshold variable and multiple regimes
The results presented so far are very supportive of the hypothesis that credit risk is cyclical. However, they also seem to suggest that the issue of cyclicality, as described by the empirical literature, has been somehow misinterpreted. Indeed, according to our evidence, the negative relationship between banks' portfolios riskiness and the business cycle holds only in either unfavorable economic conditions or when average credit quality is already unsatisfactory. By contrast, it does not seem to be statistically significant in good times (i.e., when either economic conditions improve or loan riskiness is low).
However, the small sample sizes advice us to interpret these preliminary results with caution and to improve the analysis, exploiting the cross-sectional dimension of our rich dataset. Using the information on borrowers' default rates available on a bankby-bank basis and panel data techniques, we are able to identify whether the impact of the business cycle on "bad" and "good" banks is different. At first glance, we expect bad banks to have more cyclical portfolios than good ones.
The sample size also allows us to introduce a more articulated econometric representation, with multiple thresholds over the same variable. We start with a simple model 1, which includes only a single threshold, and move on to models 2 and 3, which include 2 and 3 thresholds respectively. The use of multiple thresholds makes it possible to identify up to 4 regimes (or risk categories), in which we can classify banks (for simplicity we can refer to them as very good, good, bad, and very bad bank regime).
The default rate as the threshold variable
The results of the estimated panel data models with 2 or more regimes over the same threshold variable are provided in Table 4 . When a single threshold is introduced, we find that both good and bad banks are significantly affected by the business cycle, but the magnitude of the coefficient on GAP is larger for the bank with lower asset quality. In particular, the increase of dr as the result of 1 percentage point decrease of GAP is almost 7 times higher for bad banks.
[ Table 4 about here] Model 2 and 3 provide further strong support to the application of regimeswitching models for analyzing credit risk. We find that the magnitude of the coefficients on GAP monotonically increases as we move from low-risk to high-risk regimes. In particular, looking at the results for model 3, we note that β is equal to -0.02 and -0.09 for very good and good banks respectively, while it goes to -0.21 and -0.51 for bad and very bad ones. These are quite substantial differences.
This evidence is confirmed when lagged dr is employed as a threshold -model 5 and 6. As a robustness check, we also estimate the models for different institutional categories of banks. The results for these specifications are consistent with those presented above and are therefore not reported for the sake of brevity.
For models 1 and 2 the LR test is significant at any conventional level, while it is significant at the 5 per cent level for model 3. This indicates that the model with 4 regimes (3 thresholds) is adequate. However, when we use lagged dr, the LR test rejects the third threshold and we can only estimate a 3-regime model.
The endogenously determined thresholds can be used to assess the evolution of banks' riskiness over time. Table 5 shows the percentage of banks in each regime (or risk-category) and in each quarter for the 4-regime model (3). Figure 1 depicts the percentage and the number of banks in each regime for each quarter for models from (1) through (4).
We note that banks tended to migrate towards riskier regimes between 1992-end and 1993-end, in 1995-Q4 and 1996-Q2 ; these periods identify recessionary phases in Italy. However, no significant migration is apparent in 2001 and 2002, notwithstanding the very negative economic conditions. A possible explanation is that banks have improved borrower selection criteria in the last years; furthermore, the very low level of interest rates and the limited level of indebtedness may have helped firms and households to honor their obligations even in unfavorable times.
[ Table 5 and Figure 1 about here]
We also note that the share of banks under the fourth regime is almost unaffected by the economic environment. This extreme risk-category (dr>1.5) is probably more affected by idiosyncratic factors than systemic ones.
The output gap as the threshold variable
When GAP is used as the threshold variable (model 4), we find further evidence that the relationship between dr and GAP is stronger in recessionary conditions than in booms. This is consistent with our previous results. Unfortunately, the LR test fails to reject the null hypothesis of one regime (i.e., no threshold).
Based on the estimated thresholds for GAP, we can identify periods in which economic conditions tend to affect banks' portfolios to a larger extent than in normal times. Looking at the plot in Fig. 1 , panel D, we clearly identify 4 "high-impact" periods: between 1993-Q1 and 1994-Q2, in 1997-Q1/Q2, 1999-Q1 and 2005-Q2. We note that these periods do not necessarily overlap with recessionary business cycle phases. For the sake of comparison, we rely on the studies by Altissimo et al. (2000) and Bruno and Otranto (2004) , who provide a very consistent description of the evolution of the business cycle in Italy. During the period 1987-2002, they identify three main recessions: the first from March 1992 to July 1993, the second from November 1995 to November 1996, and the third at the end of 2001. According to our evidence, only 1993 recession is also a "high-impact" period.
Panel data model with two threshold variables and 4 regimes
The final set of results is obtained estimating a model with two different threshold variables: dr and GAP. In this way, we try to depict a comprehensive picture of the evolution of credit risk across banks and through the business cycle. It is not straightforward to guess the impact of different business cycle regimes on banks with different portfolio regimes; however, our a priori belief is that good banks are less affected by economic conditions than bad ones. In addition, for the latter intermediaries, the impact should be stronger in unfavorable times. Table 6 shows the results for the 4-regime panel data models with two different threshold variables. We focus only on model 1 and 2.
In model 1, we note that the coefficient on GAP is negative, as expected, only for good banks in expansionary periods and for bad banks in recessions. The magnitude of the coefficient is higher for bad banks, confirming the results we provided in the previous paragraphs. However, it is puzzling that the coefficient turns out to be positive and statistically significant for good banks in recession and bad banks in expansion.
[ Table 6 about here]
Model 2 provides more clear-cut results, even though some counter-intuitive evidence remains. In particular, β 14 (bad banks in expansion) is positive. Further research is needed for these models.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we try to make a step forward in explaining the macroeconomic determinants of credit risk and its evolution over the business cycle. With respect to most of the existing studies, which neglect asymmetric effects, we analyze whether the relationship between business cycle and credit risk is subject to regime switches and endogenously determine the thresholds at which regimes switch from one to another.
Using Threshold Regression approach and exploiting a unique dataset on Italian bank borrowers' default rates, we find that the impact of the business cycle is more pronounced when starting credit risk levels are higher and during unfavorable economic times. Moreover, our methodology allows us to identify the risk threshold(s) over/below which the impact is different, providing a powerful tool for financial stability monitoring.
As an example, in the two-regime model, we find that both good and bad banks are significantly affected by the business cycle, but the impact is stronger for the latter. In particular, the increase of the default rate as the result of 1 percentage point decrease of the output gap is almost 7 times higher for bad banks. This evidence is robust to the use of different proxies for the overall economic conditions and holds at various levels of aggregation. By contrast, the evidence arising from our panel data model with two threshold variables is less definite and leaves room for future research.
Overall, our results may provide some guidance to banks and supervisors in the choice of adequate capital buffers in the various phases of the business cycle and for different intermediaries, particularly under risk sensitive capital requirements.
Furthermore, the methodology we propose may be easily employed for stress testing credit risk in banks' books. Models (2), (6) and (10) Models (3), (7) and (11) Models (4), (8) and (12) 
